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MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
W. Lee Hargrave*

PUBLIC RECORDS AND TRANSFER

OF COMMUNITY

IMMOVABLES

A community property regime comes into existence upon marriage'
although the fact of the marriage is not shown in the conveyance or
mortgage records. The rules regulating management of community assets
thus come into play even though nothing in these public records indicate

that a community exists. Especially important, since 1980, is the rule
that one spouse acting alone cannot alienate, encumber, or lease com-

munity immovables regardless of the name in which those assets are
listed in the public records. 2 The basic notion is that a contract of
marriage3 is not among those documents that must be recorded to affect
4
third persons.
It is true that a registry of marriage licenses exists, along with a

return that indicates whether the marriage was celebrated, but failure
to complete the registry requirements does not invalidate the marriage
and the resulting community property regime. Even if the license is
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Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. This is so if the couple does not execute a matrimonial agreement providing
otherwise. Such a matrimonial agreement affects third persons only from the time it is
recorded. La. Civ. Code art. 2332.
2. See La. Civ. Code art. 2347, which reads as follows:
The concurrence of both spouses is required for the alienation, encumbrance,
or lease of community immovables, furniture or furnishings while located in
the family home, all or substantially all of the assets of a community enterprise
and movables issued or registered as provided by law in the names of the
spouses jointly.
See also Succession of James, 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920) (a community property
interest in an immovable may be asserted against third persons even though it is not
recorded).
3. The contract of marriage is the agreement to marry, the agreement to establish
a certain status relationship under Civil Code article 86. It is not the same as a matrimonial
agreement, which is defined in article 2328 as one relating to the property of the spouses.
4. See Redmann, The Louisiana Law of Recordation: Some Principles and Some
Problems, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 491, 502-05 (1965). This notion holds even though Civil Code
article 86 states, "Marriage is a legal relationship between a man and a woman that is
created by civil contract[,]" and Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2721 (1965) provides in
part, "No . . . contract . . . affecting immovable property shall be binding on or affect

third persons or third parties unless and until filed for registry ......
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registered, the information is located in the parish where the license was
obtained, and not necessarily where the property is located or where
the couple currently resides.' Moreover, a person married in another
state or country is not required to record evidence of his or her status
upon moving to this state. The functional result of all this is that a
person's marital status must be determined by reputation and from
information outside a reliable public record.
Even if some public record of the marriage happens to exist in a
particular parish, a separation or divorce judgment need not be recorded
in that same parish. In the United States, no certain identity documents
exist to attest to one's marital status. Under current practice, then, third
persons undertake some risk that a spouse exists even though the person
with whom they are dealing declares otherwise in some juridical act.
This seems to have been the rule at least since Succession of James.6
The supreme court applied the rule again in Camel v. Waller,7 saying
the wife acquired an interest in property acquired by the husband during
marriage despite his false declaration that he was judicially separated.
A judicial separation that terminated the community regime was subsequently obtained but it was not recorded in the conveyance records
when the husband sold the property to a third person. The court reasoned
that the judgment of separation was subject to Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:27218 and had to be recorded to affect third persons. Absent such
recordation, third persons could deal with the husband as married even
though he declared otherwise in his act of sale.
Since the sale in Camel occurred in 1977, however, before the 1980
community property revision, the husband had the authority as head of
the community to convey ownership of the community immovable without consent of the wife. Therefore, the purchaser had acquired good
title, and the court denied the wife's claim to half ownership of the
property.
The result preserves the James approach while also protecting the
third-party purchaser. Some language in the opinion, however, suggests
that the court might be willing to reconsider the James result if necessary
to protect third persons. 9
More important, since the 1980 revision, facts similar to Camel v.
Waller will result in annulment of the transfer upon the request of the

5. La. R.S. 9:252-53 (Supp. 1988).
6. 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920).
7. 526 So. 2d 1086 (La. 1988).
8. See supra note 4, quoting the relevant portions of La. R.S. 9:2721.
9. See the discussion at 526 So. 2d at 1091-92, concluding with, "The results in
these cases indicate that the law in this area is by no means settled."
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nonconsenting spouse because the consent of both is required to alienate
a community immovable. 0
This current state of the law presents a basic irony in the Camel
situation: The marriage contract is not in the public records but affects
third persons' rights in immovables transferred by the spouses, yet the
separation and divorce judgments must be recorded to affect third
persons." In Judge Redmann's words, "It appears anomalous to hold
recordation necessary for a judgment terminating the community, on
the ground that such a judgment is one affecting immovables, while
holding that the contract of marriage establishing the community need
not be recorded, even though it is, in one sense, a contract affecting
immovables." 2
It might be possible to reconsider James and conclude under the
clear text of the legislation that marriage is a contract affecting immovable property and therefore must be recorded to affect third persons.
But that would be contrary to long-established expectations and to a
policy of protecting innocent spouses against the loss of important
community assets. Furthermore, the view that recordation is not required
was implicitly recognized in the- 1980 matrimonial regimes legislation,
which provides -for establishment of the community simply by the fact
of marriage 3 and requires that matrimonial agreements providing for
some alternative to the community regime must be recorded to affect
third persons.' 4 A statutory solution requiring recordation of the marriage
would be preferable to a judicial one for the latter would involve the
practical difficulties of recording the marriage in all parishes in which
immovables are located. Legislation, on the other hand, could establish
a central statewide registry for such marriages.
Another important principle was applied by the court in Camel v.
Waller: Third parties are not entitled to rely on false declarations in
recorded acts. The court analyzed the legal situation in the case without
regard to the husband's false declarations. The result depended on the
lack of recordation of the separation judgment, not on the buyer's
ability to rely on the declaration of marital status. This approach is
necessary, for no mechanism exists whereby notaries can ever guarantee
the correctness of a person's declaration regarding marital status. Indeed,
the fundamental concept of the public records doctrine is that it is a
negative doctrine. It protects third persons against the effects of un-

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

La. Civ. Code arts. 2347, 2353.
Humphreys v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949).
Redmann, supra note 4, at 504.
La. Civ. Code art. 2334.
Id. art. 2332.
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recorded documents. It does not, and as presently organized, cannot
guarantee the correctness of recorded documents."
The situation, however, has been complicated by a 1987 statute that,
though adopted without fanfare and without the usual scrutiny given

to such civil code-related legislation, might be construed to give conclusive effect to false declarations before notaries. The statute is not
found in the Civil Code or its ancillaries, where such legislation is
usually found, but in a section of the Revised Statutes regulating notaries.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 35:11 now contains the following provisions:

B. A declaration as to one's marital status in an acquisition of
immovable property by the person acquiring the property creates

a presumption that the marital status as declared in the act of
acquisition is correct and, except as provided in Subsection C

of this Section, any subsequent alienation, encumbrance, or lease
of the immovable by onerous title shall not be attacked on the
ground that the marital status was not as stated in the declaration.

C. Any person may file an action to attack the subsequent
alienation, encumbrance, or lease on the ground that the marital
status of the party as stated in the initial act of acquisition is
false and incorrect; however, such action to attack the alienation,
encumbrance, or lease shall not affect any right or rights acquired
by a third person acting in good faith.

6

By its terms, the provision establishes a presumption of marital
status based solely upon one person's declaration in an act of acquisition

of an immovable. 17 This is so despite the fact that a notary before
15. The leading commentator on the public records doctrine, law professor and former
Judge William V. Redmann, explained it this way: "One is not protected by reliance on
the presence in the public records of a judgment of possession based on a forged will
or a false proof of heirship, or of a fraudulent cancellation of a recorded mortgage, or,
presumably, of any other invalid document. Nor is one protected by reliance on the
presence of recitations of marital status in recorded instruments. The usual plea in such
cases is reliance on the public records or on the faith of the public records. This plea
asks too much of the law of registry; it loses sight of the basically negative character
and limited scope of that law and construes recordation as creating rights, rather than
as simply making rights effective against third persons." Redmann, supra note 4, at 500.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court required reconveyance of the property to its owner
when the transferee had made false statements and had acted in reckless disregard of the
facts to secure a confirmation and registration of title from the land court. Kozdras v.
Land/Vest Properties, Inc., 382 Mass. 34, 413 N.E.2d 1105 (1980). Massachusetts has a
title registration statute that is a direct descendant of the Australian Torrens System and
is designed to protect bona fide purchasers with conclusiveness of title. See generally, B.
Shick & I. Plotkin, Torrens in the United States (1978).
16. 1987 La. Acts No. 467, § 1 (effective Sept. 1, 1987).
17. This result goes beyond the estoppel provisions of Civil Code article 2342, whereby
a spouse who appears in an act of acquisition in which the other spouse makes representations of ownership of the property is estopped from later claiming otherwise.
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whom the declaration would be made has no means normally of assuring
the truthfulness of the declaration. It would seem that one spouse
acquiring an asset without the knowledge or participation of the other
spouse could thus establish a presumption that he or she is single by
a simple declaration.
Although the presumption can be rebutted in some cases, the legislature may have intended it to be conclusive as to third person acquirers
who are in good faith. If the declarant subsequently alienates, encumbers,
or leases the immovable, an action to attack the transaction on the
grounds of the false declaration of the person's status "shall not affect
any right or rights acquired by a third person acting in good faith."
The language used here, however, is not as clear as it might be. If the
provision had included only Part B, it would have been clear that any
alienation, encumbrance, or lease "shall not be attacked," language that
indicates a conclusive presumption. However, Part C states that an
action to avoid a transfer "shall not affect any right or rights acquired
by a third person acting in good faith."
In the normal case in which a married person states that he or she
is unmarried and purports to transfer a community asset, the third
person does not acquire ownership. All that person gets is a relatively
null title, which could be either ratified or annulled by the other spouse."
Since "no right [was] acquired by a third person," it is then arguable
that the statute does not preclude the other spouse from attacking the
transfer. That seems to be the technical, literal meaning of the words
here. On the other hand, it is questionable that the legislation would
have had any other purpose than to protect such third persons.
In any event, the ambiguity of the statute's language might provide
the courts with a basis for returning to the basic principles and basic
policies of the public records system in construing the statute. In view
of the placement of the statute outside of the main provisions dealing
with protecting good faith purchasers and considering the danger that
a conclusive presumption would encourage fraud, the courts may have
sufficient grounds to limit the statute's effect. 9
Pensions-Dividing the Pension Check
Under the authority of T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery2° and
Sims,2 ' a court can order divorced or separated spouses to
remain owners in indivision of one spouse's contingent pension rights.

Sims v.

18. La. Civ. Code art. 2352.
19. Subsection D also provides expressly that the statute is to apply retroactively to
any such declarations made before the effective date of the statute. La. R.S. 35:11(D)
(Supp. 1988).
20. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1975).
21. 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
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When payments under the pension plan commence, the spouses are
required to divide each payment according to their respective ownership
interests in those rights. The Civil Code matrimonial regimes provisions
contain no special authorization for ordering the pension fund administrator to deal with a nonmember of the plan such as the other spouse.
Under general privity principles it would seem that the provider could
be required only to issue one check to its member.2 2 That member would
23
then be required to make a payment to the ex-spouse.
The inconvenience of such a situation to potentially combative exspouses is obvious, as is the problem of continuing litigation to enforce
payment orders. To ameliorate these problems, the supreme court in
Eskine v. Eskine24 ordered a retirement system to pay one-half of the
benefits due to the retired employee directly to his former wife. The
source of authority for such an order is somewhat thin: the court relied
on the very general terms of article 2164 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that "the appellate court shall render any
judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal."
It may well be argued that such a general procedural article cannot
supplant the substantive law of obligations. However, as Justice Lemmon
remarked in a concurring opinion, "resort to La. C.C.P. art. 2164 to
order the Retirement System to issue separate monthly benefit checks
serves everyone's interest." 25 Such an order may well inconvenience the
retirement system provider, but any inconvenience should be minor, for
such systems are normally equipped with the necessary processing equipment to divide benefits among spouses and survivors of covered members
with little real difficulty. 26 More importantly, this inconvenience is outweighed by the important benefits the order affords to the nonmember
spouse.
Management-Enforcement of Debts
A basic principle of obligations law is that one is personally liable
only for his or her own contractual and delictual obligations and not

22. Analysis and Interpretation of the New Matrimonial Regimes Law, 42 La. L.
Rev. 725, 770 (1982).
23. The federal legislation providing for application of state community property laws
to military pensions does contain a provision by which the United States will make the
actual payment to both spouses. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
24. 518 So. 2d 505 (La. 1988).
25. Id.at 509.
26. Accord, Quirk v. Quirk, 524 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988). The pension
board in this case was neither cited as a party, nor served with the original petition.
Nonetheless, the board "appealed this judgment." Id. at 280. But note the dictum,
"Besides, this judgment does not purport to exercise jurisdiction over the Board. It merely
adjudicates rights in the pension fund." Id. at 281.
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for those of others, unless some statute provides for such vicarious
personal liability. 27 Personal liability means, of course, that in addition
to the existing property, the property to be acquired in the future by28
the responsible party can be seized and sold to satisfy the obligation.
No law makes spouses personally liable for each other's obligations,
except for the narrow codical provision adopted in 1979 that makes
them solidarily liable with each other for necessities. 29 This rule applies,
by its terms, to spouses under a separate property regime and is not
part of the community property system.
The principle of no vicarious liability for each other's debts applies
even if the spouses are living under a community regime. In that case,
the legislation makes the existing community property available to the
creditors of both spouses, a type of in rem liability of the property,
rather than establishing personal liability.30
The court of appeal for the second circuit applied these principles
in Lawson v. Lawson3 and held that the wife was not personally liable
on two promissory notes executed by the husband during the existence
of the community. The court did recognize, of course, that the plaintiffcreditor could reach all of the community property existing at the time
of the termination of the community. In Lawson, the plaintiff-creditor
did not contest a lower court determination that the debt was a separate
obligation of the husband. That fact, however, should not affect the
result, since the creditor's rights under Louisiana Civil Code articles
2345 and 2357 are not dependent on the classification of the debt. The
primary concern is the person who contracted the obligation, not the
type of obligation that is contracted; that person's separate property
and all of the community property can be reached by creditors.
Personal liability of a spouse for the debts of the other spouse can
arise under Louisiana Civil Code article 2357 if, after termination of
the community, a spouse disposes of a former community asset for a
purpose other than satisfaction of a community obligation. In Lawson,
however, no proof of such a disposition was presented. Even if there

27. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Louisiana Constitutional Law,
45 La. L. Rev. 397, 399 (1984). See also Comment, Liability of the Husband for
Contractual Obligations of His Wife-Louisiana Legislation and Jurisprudence, 30 La. L.
Rev. 441 (1970); Bilbe, Community Property Symposium-" Management" of Community
Assets Under Act 627, 39 La. L. Rev. 409 (1979).
28. La. Civ. Code art. 3182: "Whoever has bound himself personally, is obliged to
fulfill his engagements out of all his property, movable and immovable, present and
future."
29. La. Civ. Code art. 2372, adopted by 1979 La. Acts No. 709.
30. La. Civ. Code arts. 2345, 2357. Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited:
1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 La. L. Rev.
83, 122 (1979).
31. No. 19,840-CA, 1988 La. App. Lexis 1724, 1988 WL 85629 (2d Cir. 1988).
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had been such proof, the personal liability of the spouse would have
been limited to the value of the former community property that was
alienated.32
In a similar case, First National Bank of Commerce v. Ordoyne,"
the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that a husband was
not liable where his wife, after obtaining a credit card by forging his
name on the application form, accumulated several charges on the
account. The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the husband
was liable in tort because of the wife's fraud, for again, there was no
proof that he participated in the fraud.
Another application of the principle of no vicarious liability of
spouses came in Ciaccio v. Cazayoux, 4 a case in which the pregnant
wife, but not the husband, signed an arbitration agreement with her
obstetrician. Twins were born prematurely, but died afterwards. The
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal enforced the agreement as it
applied to her claims for malpractice, but held that the husband was
not bound. He could pursue his claims against the physician without
first arbitrating them.35
The first circuit, however, was not as clear on the principle that
spouses are not generally personally liable for one another. In. Bridges
v. Osborne,3 6 a creditor attempted to collect a sum from both the
husband and the wife. Testimony established that the plaintiff-painter
contracted with the wife to paint one-half of a duplex. Although the
factual record was less than clear, it appears that the only evidence of
the husband's connection with the incurring of the obligation was that
the wife told plaintiff during a phone conversation, "Wait just a minute.
I'll get back with you. I'm going to talk to my husband." ' 7 The court
of appeal determined that the painting contract was a community debt
even though it was the wife's separate property that was being maintained38
and then stated, "As such, these expenditures are a community obligation
for which both Mr. and Mrs. Osborne are responsible. See La. C.C.
art. 2345." 39

32.

La. Civ. Code art. 2357, para. 2. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 30, at 124-

33.
33. 528 So. 2d 1068 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
34. 519 So. 2d 799 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
35. The court also held that the survival claims of the children, who lived a short
time before their death, were also not precluded.
36. 525 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 530 So. 2d 567 (1988).
37. Id. at 340.
38. This conclusion probably was justifiable, since the community would get the
benefit of the rental income, and the painting was an expense related to the generation
of the community income. See Analysis and Interpretation of the Matrimonial Regimes
Law, 42 La. L. Rev. 725, 789 (1982).
39. 525 So. 2d at 342.
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Article 2345 does not support the court's conclusion. Indeed, under
article 2345, characterization of the debt as separate or as community
is irrelevant to the issue of the third person's enforcement rights. Under
the clear language of that article, the issue is who was a contracting
party; the third person can enforce the debt against that party's separate
estate and the entire community. But no personal liability is provided
against the noncontracting spouse. The issue in Bridges was whether the
husband was an obligor under the contract; in other words, whether he
contracted with the painter. Perhaps the court could have concluded
from the testimony that the wife sought hig authorization to hire the
painter, and thus that he expressed his consent to be bound. Such a
factual inference, however, would have been a rather questionable determination given the limited evidence.
It is true that spouses can act as agents and mandataries for each
other, and that an agent-spouse acting in the name of the other can
bind the other personally. Indeed, the law prior to the 1980 revision
had stretched the principles of apparent authority and ratification to
allow wives to bind the husbands who were managers of the community. 4
The holding in the Bridges case, however, goes beyond those cases.
More important, after the 1980 revision, it is no longer necessary to
rely upon such circuitous means to empower the wife to bind the husband
and thus to enable her creditors to reach the community assets: the
revised provisions, particularly articles 2345 and 2357, directly and explicitly authorize the wife to obligate the community assets in this way.
Reimbursement-Retroactivity
Under the prior law, reimbursement for community funds used to
improve separate property, or vice versa, was based on the enhanced
value of the property that was improved. In an inflationary economy,
that rule often resulted in the spouses sharing the windfall resulting
from inflation. The 1980 revision changed the basis for reimbursement,
fixing the award according to the amount of funds used. In an inflationary economy, this rule gives a windfall to the owner of the property;
in a deflationary economy, it would work to the advantage of the person
who contributed the funds. It thus appears that the interests of the
spouse making the contribution of funds may have been harmed by the
change, raising the issue of whether the new law, if applied to funds
contributed before 1980, would result in a taking without due process.
An initial issue is the extent to which anything that is "vested" or
anything that one had strong expectations of recovering has been taken.
Technically, the right to be reimbursed does not arise until the community

40.

See Comment, supra note 27.
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is terminated, and then only as part of an overall liquidation and
accounting of the countervailing claims of both spouses. This prospect
of obtaining an enhanced value is more like what is traditionally termed
an expectancy interest than an interest that has already vested. This
characterization of the interest apparently was adopted by the First
Circuit in Guarisco v. Guarisco, 4 where the court approved the application of the new level of reimbursement to claims arising out of a
1968 marriage and a 1983 divorce. The court stated, "The trial court
was correct in applying Louisiana Civil Code Article 2368, since the
right to claim reimbursement for enhancement of the value of separate
property becomes available upon dissolution of the community and not

before.'

'42

Matrimonial Agreements
A growing body of jurisprudence is demonstrating the usefulness of
the expanded authority that spouses have to enter into matrimonial
agreements. Thurman v. Thurman43 demonstrates the flexibility that
spouses have to use such agreements even at a time of impending
separation or divorce. The spouses, as part of the agreement, provided
for the establishment of an escrow account containing $159,000 in community funds. Those funds were to pay future obligations of an uncertain
amount relating to a tax shelter. The wife, however, made some withdrawals for other purposes in violation of the agreement, and the court
ordered her to return to the escrow account the amount of funds she
wrongfully withdrew.
In O'Krepki v. O'Krepki4 4 the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal, one judge dissenting, recognized that spouses could contract
during marriage to change their matrimonial regime retroactive to the
date of their marriage. The spouses had contracted a separate property
regime before their marriage in 1984 and then contracted in 1986 to
"re-establish the community of acquets and gains constituting the legal
regime ... as though they had not taken any action previous to
4
marriage."
Anything not prohibited may be the object of a contract, and it
would seem that no provisions of the Civil Code or the Revised Statutes
explicitly prohibit retroactive application of matrimonial agreements. In

41. 526 So. 2d 1126 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 1337 (1988).
42. Id.at 1127.
43. 521 So. 2d 579 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
44. 529 So. 2d 1317 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
45. Id. at 1318. The term "re-establish" was perhaps ambiguous since no community
had ever been established, but the court found an intent to establish the community
retroactively.
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terms of substantive law, such agreements may have the effect of donating property 46 from one spouse to another, but donations between
spouses are not prohibited. 47 In terms of form, the Code contains no
explicit requirement, as the defendant in O'Krepki urged, that a valid
transfer requires an enumeration of each specific item being donated.
That there is no such itemization requirement is supported by Louisiana
Civil Code article 155, which has long provided that the spouses may,
upon their reconciliation after a judgment of separation, re-establish the
community without an itemization of the assets involved. It should also
be noted that retroactive application of a matrimonial agreement does
not threaten the interests of third persons, since those interests are not
4
affected by the agreement's provisions until the time of recordation. 1

46. And thus may cause some tax problems and also may complicate matters of
forced heirship since donations are considered in determining the legitime.
47. Analysis and Interpretation of the Matrimonial Regimes Law, 42 La. L. Rev.
725, 727 (1982).
48. La. Civ. Code art. 2332.

